Introduction
As was the case in 2009, the 2011 Nevada legislature faced an environment characterized by recession, a budget crisis and a political budget fight. Republican Governor Brian Sandoval was committed to the formulation of a balanced 2011-2013 biennial budget based upon reduced spending, no tax increases and no new taxes. January 2011 ushered in a new year and a realization that the Nevada budget crisis had not improved from the year 2010. Nevada's dependency on sales tax revenue and gaming tax revenue maintained the budget crisis at a serious level, because the economy and state revenue continued to lag. In essence, it appeared as though the economy in Nevada hit bottom and was flat as the 2011 Nevada leg-islature attempted to address the 2011-2013 biennial budget. The Republicans in the legislature, along with Governor Sandoval, were unified in their commitment to the enactment of a 2011-2013 biennial budget that was balanced with no tax increases nor new taxes. Many Democrats were of the view that Nevada needed to increase taxes and consider the enactment of new taxes, and proposed new taxes. Political deadlock characterized the 2011 legislature until the end of May of 2011 when the Nevada State Supreme Court issued an opinion that served as the catalyst for the members of the State Assembly, State Senate and Governor Sandoval to arrive at a compromise.
Nevada's budgetary politics have generally been highlighted by low levels of service provision and over-reliance on two primary sources of revenue, namely, sales and gaming taxes (Herzik 1991 (Herzik , 1992 Herzik and Statham 1993; Herzik and Morin 1995; Morin 1994 Morin , 1996 Morin , 1997 Morin , 1998 . This article will examine the Nevada political environment, the state biennial process, and the fiscal environment. This article will also examine the 2010 General Election and the 2011 Nevada legislature.
The Nevada Political Environment
The Nevada political environment is a composite of Nevada's political culture, government structure and tax structure. The health of the national and state eco nomies directly impacts the operation of state government. The Nevada legislature and government are sensitive to public opinion, and Nevada's biennial budget usually conforms to public opinion and the results of the preceding general election (Herzik and Morin 1995; .
Political Culture
Nevada's political culture is individualistic. An individualistic political culture possesses a political environment where politics is kind of an open marketplace where individuals and interest groups pursue social and economic goals (Elazar 1984; Dye 1994; Bowman and Kearney 1996) . Nevada's political culture emphasizes limited government, fiscal conservatism, fragmentation of state governmental power and citizen control over government at the ballot box. In terms of partisan politics, Nevada is becoming more Democrat than Republican. Nevada's party competition classification in the 1970s was two-party Democratic dominant; however, in the 1980s this classification changed to two-party Republican leaning (Hrebenar and Benedict 1991) . In terms of party identification, a November-December 1996 poll revealed that southern Nevada leaned Democrat while northern and rural Nevada leaned Republican (Beal et al. 1997 (Morin 1994 (Morin , 1996 Herzik and Statham 1993; Herzik and Morin 1995) . Nevada historically has provided a relatively low level of state services resulting in a low tax burden (Morin 1994 (Morin , 1996 Herzik and Statham 1993; Herzik and Morin 1995) . In the past, Nevadans were not necessarily opposed to spending on state programs; however, Nevadans wanted othersvisitors, tourists, gamblers and corporations -to bear much of the tax burden (Winter, Calder and Carns 1993) .
Government Structure
Nevada's Constitution structures government at the state level by apportioning power between the legislative, executive and judicial branches (Driggs and Goodall 1996) . It provides for a weak, fragmented and decentralized executive branch. The governor, who possesses package veto power, shares executive power and authority with other elected executive officials, boards, commissions, and councils (Driggs and Goodall 1996; Morin 1997a ). Nevada's Constitution provides for a bicameral legislature. The state Senate is comprised of 20 members serving four-year terms. The state Assembly is comprised of 42 members serving two-year terms (Driggs and Goodall 1996; Titus 1997) . The Nevada legislature meets on a biennial basis, is a citizen or amateur legislature, and is one of a small number of state legislatures to employ a biennial budget system (Thomas 1991; Herzik 1992; Morin 1994 Morin , 1996 Herzik and Morin 1995) . The Nevada legislature's part-time status, low levels of staff support, and crowded agenda during a 120-day biennial session inadequately equips the legislature to address long-term budgeting and policy issues in any significant manner (Herzik 1992; Morin 1994 Morin , 1996 Herzik and Morin 1995) .
The Nevada judicial branch consists of a seven-member Supreme Court, district, family, justice and municipal courts. The state's voters have repeatedly rejected proposed constitutional amendments to create an intermediate appellate court (Driggs and Goodall 1996; Neilander 1997) . The Nevada Constitution specifically provides for the various types of courts; however, it grants considerable authority to the legislature to determine the structure and operation of the judicial system. Although elected officials of the legislative and executive branches run for office on a partisan ballot, all state and local judges are elected on a non-partisan ballot by Nevada voters (Bushnell and Driggs 1984) .
Nevadans have a long tradition of taking matters into their own hands at the polls and have shaped the structure, operation and direction of state and local government. The Constitution provides for the recall of public officers, the initiative, and the referendum (Bushnell and Driggs 1984; Driggs and Goodall 1996) .
Nevada's governmental structure necessarily entails a lack of capacity to adequately respond to economic and budget problems. Heavy reliance upon gaming and sales tax revenue renders Nevada highly vulnerable to economic trends, which must be addressed by the legislature more than once every two years (Morin 1994 (Morin , 1996 Herzik and Morin 1995) . Presently, the legislature employs an Interim Finance Committee in order to address fiscal and budget matters, which may arise between regular sessions. The Interim Finance Committee is comprised of members of the Senate Committee on Finance and the Assembly Committee on Ways and Means from the preceding legislative session (Legislative Counsel Bureau 1997).
Tax and Fiscal Structure
Beginning in the late 1970s, Nevada moved from having a state and local revenue system characterized as more decentralized to having one more centralized than the average state and local revenue system in the USA (Ebel 1990) . In 1979, the legislature enacted a tax relief package and, in response, Nevada voters defeated a constitutional initiative to limit local property taxes, which was similar to California's Proposition 13 (Ebel 1990) . As a result, control of local revenues has been shifted from local elected officials to the legislature and its Interim Finance Committee, and to the Nevada Tax Commission (Ebel 1990 ). Nevada presently possesses one of the most centralized fiscal systems in the USA. The state controls, in one way or another, approximately 80% of the total revenues of local governments (Atkinson and Oleson 1993) . Fiscal centralization refers to the degree to which the state restricts local governmental autonomy to determine the level and mix of revenues and expenditures (Gold 1989) . Prior to the reduction in local property taxes in 1979 and a tax shift in 1981, only school district revenue was highly centralized, and local governments primarily survived on their own tax base (Ebel 1990) .
The Nevada Constitution requires a balanced budget for the state (Driggs and Goodall 1996) . Although the Constitution previously limited the level of state general obligation debt to 1% of the state's assessed property value, Nevada voters approved a ballot question in 1996 which amended the Constitution to increase the limit to 2% (Ebel 1990; Driggs and Goodall 1996) . Debt issued for the purpose of protecting or preserving the state's property or natural resources are excepted from the 2% constitutional debt limit (Ebel 1990) .
Nevada relies on seven main types of taxes as sources of revenue for the state's General Fund. The seven types of taxes include sales, gaming, casino entertainment, business license, mining, cigarette, and insurance premiums. Gaming and sales taxes were to constitute approximately 50% of the General Fund revenue for the biennium (Legislative Counsel Bureau 2010 . Earmarking, the dedication of certain tax revenues to specific programs, is popular in Nevada with both politicians and the public. Nevada is one of the most earmarked states in the USA (Ebel 1990) . Nevada ranks 5th among the 50 states, earmarking 52% of its total state tax revenues, which is almost two-and-one-half times the earmarking rate of 21% of the average state (Gold et al. 1987) . Earmarking presents three main disadvantages for state government. First, the legislature lacks systematic review in the regular appropriation process. Second, earmarking reduces legislative flexibility in tailoring the budget to address economic changes. Third, once a revenue source has been earmarked, legislators may feel that they are absolved from further responsibility to appropriate additional General Fund revenues to the program (Ebel 1990; Thomas 1991; Winter 1993) .
Nevada has no personal income tax, and the legislature lacks any real ability to enact a personal income tax because voters passed a state constitutional prohibition on personal income taxation (Herzik 1991) . Nevada state law requires a 5% minimum balance of the General Fund at the end of each fiscal year that cannot be touched (O'Driscoll 1994) . Nevada lacks a unified budgeting and accounting system, which renders it quite difficult to examine the state's finances in a comprehensive manner (Dobra 1993) . Over the course of the past many years, gaming and sales taxes have represented approximately 75%-50% of all state revenue (Herzik 1992; Morin 1994 Morin , 1996 Morin , 1997 Morin , 1998 Herzik and Morin 1995; Legislative Counsel Bureau 2005 , 2010 . The only viable tax policy options available to the legislature entail increased tax burdens on business, increasing the sales tax rate and increasing property taxes (Dobra 1993 ; Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1994). The legislature does have the option of increasing non-tax revenues, such as charges for services, licenses, fees and fines ( Legislative Counsel Bureau 1997a).
The Nevada Budgeting Process
The Nevada budgeting process is driven by the condition of the national economy and the state economy. Nevada's heavy reliance upon gaming and sales taxes for state revenue places Nevada in a position of being quite vulnerable to economic fluctuations. The fate of Nevada's economy is contingent upon the state of the national economy (State of Nevada Economic Forum 1994; Morin 1996) . Nevada experienced the effects of the 1981-1982 national recession, resulting in a budget crisis during the 1981-1983 biennium (Herzik and Statham 1993; State of Nevada Economic Forum 1994) . Nevada again experienced the effects of the 1990-1991 national recession, resulting in a budget crisis during the 1991-1993 biennium (Morin 1994; State of Nevada Economic Forum 1994) . The fortunes of Nevada's economy in the 1990s and 2000s have paralleled the fortunes of the national economy.
State Budgeting Process
The budget process in Nevada consists of four stages: (1) executive preparation and presentation, (2) legislative review and adoption, (3) implementation, and (4) review. The four stages are not discrete; they overlap with some activities occurring simultaneously (Driggs and Goodall 1996) . Stage one, executive preparation and presentation, begins in the spring of even-numbered years; which was the spring of 2010 for the 2011-2013 biennial budget. The state budget director, a gubernatorial appointee, requests that state agencies prepare their budget requests. Agencies are required to estimate their needs three-and-one-half years ahead of the end of the biennial budget. The state budget director may also provide guidelines for agencies to follow in the agency budget request formulation process (Driggs and Goodall 1996; Reno Gazette-Journal 1996) . The guidelines may limit agency requests, such as to a maximum increase of 4% over the existing biennial budget of the agency, and can also incorporate the governor's priorities for the upcoming biennium. The state budget director may convey to state agencies a governor's directive that agencies are to hold the line or that there will be no new taxes (Driggs and Goodall 1996) .
All state agencies must submit their biennial budget requests to the state budget director by September 1 of the even-numbered years. The state budget director spends September through December examining the agency budget requests, meeting with each agency head, estimating how much revenue will be available for the biennium, and trying to put together a set of budget recommendations that will be acceptable to the governor. The state budget director informs each agency head in December of the office's preliminary budget for the agency. In the event an agency is unsatisfied with its preliminary budget, the agency has the right to make an appeal to the governor. Agency budget requests are submitted to the Nevada legislature by December 10 (Driggs and Goodall 1996; Reno Gazette-Journal 1996) . State agency budgets are outside of the one for the state's building program. The State Public Works Manager receives state construction requests and must present a list of requested projects to the governor by October 1 for ultimate inclusion in the governor's proposed executive budget (Reno GazetteJournal 1996) .
Prior to 1993, the governor was responsible for submitting a budget proposal to the legislature containing his estimated forecast of future state General Fund revenues and proposed expenditures (Morin 1997a) . The 1991-1993 budget broke ranks with past budgets and adopted an aggressive 30% increase in state spending based upon a quite optimistic revenue estimate accepted by the Nevada legislature and the governor. Nevada's break with conservative budget practises could not have been more poorly timed (Herzik and Morin 1995) . "Almost immediately after the fiscal year commenced, the effect of the National recession began to show up in Nevada. State revenue collections plunged and a hiring freeze was invoked. Over the next 18 months, state agencies suffered through three budget revertments" (Herzik and Statham 1993: 59) . In response to the 1991-1993 biennial budget crisis, the legislature enacted legislation in 1993, which provided for the creation of an Economic Forum to estimate and forecast future state General Fund revenues. The Forum, a panel of five economic and taxation experts from the private sector, is required to adopt an official forecast of future state General Fund revenues for the biennial budget cycle. All agencies of the state, including the governor and legislature, are required to use the Forum's forecast (State of Nevada Economic Forum 1994). The Forum must provide its first forecast no later than December 1 of the even-numbered years, just shortly before the beginning of a new legislative session (State of Nevada Economic Forum 1996). The 1993 enactment effectively reduced the scope of the governor's formal powers in preparing the budget.
The second stage of the budget process is legislative review and adoption, which begins with the governor providing the legislature with a general outline of priorities and the proposed executive budget in the State of the State Address during the first week of the biennial legislative session. The proposed executive budget is delivered to the legislature shortly after the Governor's State of the State Address (Driggs and Goodall 1996) . The 1995 Nevada legislature attempted to challenge the executive branch's institutional powers by proposing the establishment of a state legislative budget office, similar to the Congressional Budget Office, which would have been responsible for drafting its own version of the state budget for review by the money committees of the Assembly and Senate (Morin 1997a) . The legislature and Governor Miller ultimately reached a compromise when Governor Miller threatened to veto the proposed legislative budget office. The compromise entailed giving legislative budget analysts more say in the preparation of the executive budget drafted by the governor's office; however, the compromise legislation contained a sunset clause providing that the legislation would be void after two years (Morin 1997a ). In accordance with this 1995 legislative enactment, the Fiscal Analysis Division of the Legislative Counsel Bureau provided the 1997 legislature with its first report that provided legislators a summary of the financial status of the State and Governor Miller's budget recommendations for the 1997-1999 biennium (Legislative Counsel Bureau 1997a).
The legislative review process is centered almost entirely in the Senate Finance Committee and the Assembly Ways and Means Committee. State budgeting issues and the governor's budget recommendations are considered by these committees in the context of public hearings and are the subject of interest group and lobbying activities and the subject of discussion and compromises by state legislators (Driggs and Goodall 1996) . The Taxation Committee in each house considers tax bills and must act before the Assembly Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees can finalize the biennial budget. Although the Economic Forum must provide its first forecast no later than December 1 of the evennumbered years, the Forum is required to revise its forecast, if necessary, by May 1 during the legislative session. If either the governor or the legislature want to appropriate more than what is available pursuant to the Forum's official forecast, a revenue enhancement proposal must be made (State of Nevada Economic Forum 1996; Legislative Counsel Bureau 1997a). A reconciliation process takes place between the two money committees prior to the budget going to the floors of the two houses for approval. Consideration of the budget by the full houses is almost always perfunctory (Driggs and Goodall 1996) . The second stage of the budget process concludes with legislative passage of the biennial budget and presentation to the governor for signature. The governor lacks effective power to resist legislative changes in the budget that he prepares and presents to the legislature. Nevada's governor is the only governor in the 13 western states to lack line-item veto power; therefore, he must sign or veto the budget passed by the legislature as an entire package. Unlike the President, he lacks pocket veto power. Any bills vetoed by the governor after the legislature has adjourned its biennial session are subject to veto override attempts two years later when the legislature meets again for its next regular session. A vetoed bill must receive a two-thirds vote of all members elected to each house in order to over-ride a governor's veto and become law (Driggs and Goodall 1996; Morin 1997a) .
The third stage of Nevada's budgeting process is implementation and is the responsibility of the executive branch. The Nevada legislature employs an Interim Finance Committee to address budget and fiscal matters which may arise between regular sessions. The Interim Finance Committee is comprised of members of the Senate Finance Committee and the Assembly Ways and Means Committee from the preceding legislative session (Driggs and Goodall 1996; Legislative Counsel Bureau 1997) .
The fourth stage of Nevada's budgeting process is review, which entails reviewing the past budget activities of state government. The state Controller audits claims against the state and the Legislative Auditor's office also conducts periodic audits of the financial records of the various agencies. The state Budget Director and the Legislative Fiscal Analysts review past budgets when they prepare recommendations for the future. Lastly, the legislative money committees review past budget actions as they are considering and formulating the next, new biennial budget (Driggs and Goodall 1996) .
In 1991, the Nevada legislature created a "rainy day" fund to help stabilize the state budget. This enactment created a state trust fund which would be built up during good times and would be accessed in the case of a fiscal emergency. When the state General Fund surplus reaches a certain threshold at the end of a fiscal year, a portion of the excess is held in the "rainy day" trust fund to help the state through fiscal emergencies (Herzik and Morin 1995; Morin 1996; Legislative Counsel Bureau 1997a) . The 1995 legislature indexed the maximum limit on the rainy day fund to 10% of annual appropriations (Legislative Counsel Bureau 1997a).
The Nevada Fiscal Environment
Nevada's heavy reliance upon gaming and sales taxes for state revenue places Nevada in a position of being quite vulnerable to economic fluctuations. The fate of Nevada's economy is contingent upon the state of the national economy (Morin 2001) . The nation's economy began its 10th year of economic expansion in the spring of 2000 and through November 2000 the nation's economy had continued to grow. The nation's economy had been growing for 116 consecutive months, representing the longest expansion of the nation's economy in the history of the USA (State of Nevada Economic Forum 2000). As we entered early 2007, the Nevada economy remained strong and it was anticipated that the current decade would be characterized by impressive growth (Nevada Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation 2007). The Nevada economy, although strong, was beginning to cool down as the legislature began to debate the final compo- The unemployment rate in January 2011 was 13.6%; although the unemployment rate improved to 12.4% in June 2011, Nevada continued to experience the highest unemployment rate of any state in the USA. Gaming revenue and sales tax revenue slowly increased during the first half of 2011. Nevada is suffering from the effects of a long-term housing slowdown, foreclosures, increasing fuel prices, reduced tourist traffic, lack of available credit for commercial construction projects, high levels of unemployment, reduced consumer confidence and increasing consumer prices (Nevada Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation 2008a , 2008b , 2008c , 2009a O'Driscoll 2008) .
The 2010 General Election
The year 2010 was a year of Republican success in many parts of the USA; however, there was no Republican wave of victory in Nevada. 
The 2011 Nevada Legislature
The Nevada economy and biennial budget were the dominant issue areas confronting the 2011 legislature. In fact, the preoccupation of Governor Sandoval and the 2011 legislature with the budget resulted in political deadlock and almost no other bills and issues of substance were addressed. According to the Nevada Constitution, the 2011 Nevada State Legislature had the responsibility to reapportion the Nevada legislature and districts for the US House of Representatives. Two lawsuits were filed during the course of the 2011 Session of the legislature regarding reapportionment, evidencing political fighting and deadlock regarding the reapportionment issue. The 2011 legislature adjourned without satisfying its reapportionment obligation. Governor Sandoval took the position that he would not call a special session of the legislature to enact a reapportionment plan and that he would leave the issue of reapportionment to Nevada's judiciary (Hager 2011) . 
Conclusion
The approach of the 2011 Nevada legislature was essentially the same approach employed by the 2009 legislature. The 2009 legislature passed multiple taxation bills that collectively constituted a $781 million tax increase over the course of the 2009-2011 biennium. The tax package included increases to the sales and use tax, room tax, Modified Business Tax, Governmental Services Tax, and the shortterm car rental tax (Legislative Counsel Bureau 2009a). These tax enhancements were temporary and were scheduled to sunset at the end of the 2011 session of the legislature. The Nevada State Supreme Court was responsible for breaking the political deadlock that transpired throughout the course of the 2011 legislature regarding the 2011-2013 biennial budget proceedings. The 2011 legislature was able to achieve agreement with Governor Sandoval and extend the sunset tax package for another period of two years. This tax package is scheduled to sunset in 2013. The 2011 legislature did not address the budgetary problems in Nevada in any meaningful fashion. It failed to enact a reapportionment plan and essentially provided the judiciary with the opportunity to complete this legislative function. It looks as though the budget problems of Nevada shall be present once again during the 2013 Nevada legislature. Just how long can one kick the can down the road? Apparently, the can will be around to kick down the road again during the 2013 Nevada Legislature.
